The book goes in two diametrically opposed directions. It starts off by reassuring the reader that the conventional view - the Russian nuke gone awry - is very very unlikely, and explains why.

Then he switches tack, and tears into Pakistan and its Dr. A. Q. Khan. He states a few broad assumptions, and then goes from there. There is little critical thinking - for example whether Western double standards vis a vis India contributed to the arms race, and whether the much hyped AQ network could actually deliver anything "useful" to the buyers, instead of the technical equivalent of nuts and bolts.

Its a great read, but its basically "24" in intellectual clothing.

Mr. Langewiesche has a leftist progressive agenda and a bad case of cultural relativism run amuck. His nasty remarks about Paul Tibbets turned me off from the get go. Save your money on this one.

Don't waste your money on this book.

It is a diservice to the non-proliferation efforts to lull people into a false sense of security by exagerating how difficult it is to obtain nuclear fissile material or the resources needed to make a bomb after you have the material.

The author rehashes incorrect facts about the difficulty of making an illicit nuclear fission bomb, whether is the amount of HEU or the use of abundant power reactor plutonium, the need for a nuclear scientist, the length of time it takes to make one after you have the material, etc.

His trek through Russia to Ozersk is not representative of the dramatic changes under Yeltsin and Putin, and the decay of the nuclear and social infrastructure; suffice to say that US is desperate to plug a lot of holes by providing US taxpayers money...with questionable impact.

Finally, the rehash of A.Q. Khan's story is thin on facts and lessons learned...particularly how easy gullible democracies make it for proliferators to obtain the education and technical resources, and then turn a blind eye to these themselves becoming further proliferation vectors...One does not need to look further than the home grown terrorists, whether in US or UK...these are people with the intellectual ability and training (Engineers, technical PhD's, doctors,...)to pretty much exploit our democracy for their nefarious ends...

The decades that followed the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been relatively peaceful and without nuclear incident. That in itself is a miracle. In the early years the Nuclear Club was small: it consisted of the United States, Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union. These countries had the requisite infrastructure to develop the nuclear weapons of that era. In recent years the Club has greatly expanded, it now includes Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and probably Iran. With advances in technology and easy access to information, about 20 more countries are in position to produce such weapons. Worse yet, the technology is now so advanced and compact that it can easily fall into the hands of nonstate actors - i.e. terrorists - for whom the traditional strategies of deterrence and containment are not effective.

William Langewiesche, formerly of "The Atlantic" and currently of "Vanity Fair," explains why nuclear weapons have become such an attractive tool for weak and poor countries. Since there are fewer technical hurdles and the information is readily available, it is an inexpensive way to gain respect and notoriety; or, in the case of North Korea, to blackmail.

In his research for this book, Langewiesche imagined how a resourceful terrorist would go about acquiring nuclear material. What is needed is about a 100 lbs of highly enriched uranium (HEU); Russia possesses about 600 metric tons. He flies to Ekaterinburg, and from there goes to Ozarsk, one of Russia's many nuclear cities. Langewiesche notices that the facilities are poorly guarded by guards who are poorly paid and have a reputation for being drunk on the job. With the presence of lavish homes in the area and luxury goods in the stores in a city that has no visible means of income, there is without doubt a culture of corruption. For a few million dollars they would be more than happy to part with a few bricks of HEU. Smuggling the goods out of the country would also be fairly easy and for the same reason. Russia's southern border is lined with some of the most corrupt and lawless countries on earth. Border guards would be more than happy to look the other way for a few extra dollars. After that a small lab would be needed to build the weapon and perhaps a shipping container or small plane to deliver it. This scenario is very much in the realm of the possible.

Much of this book is devoted not to the hypothetical but the actual case of Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan was actually a metallurgist, not a nuclear scientist as many have claimed, who worked for a Dutch company where uranium was enriched. He copied blueprints of centrifuges and purchased the necessary parts on the black market. Khan then went back to Pakistan and developed its nuclear weapons capabilities. Secretly he set up a nuclear supermarket offering his goods to Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea, and who knows how many others. Khan is still considered a national hero in Pakistan and Langewiesche excoriates the Musharraf government who has done little to punish Khan other than to put him under house arrest.

Langewiesche also recounts the efforts of Mark Hibbs, an American journalist in Bonn and an expert on the nuclear industry. Hibbs was one of the first to disclose Khan's nuclear arms bazaar. Unfortunately the disclosures came after the damage had already been done. According to Langewiesche, "no amount of maneuvering will keep determined nations from developing nuclear arsenals."

Despite the fact that Langewiesche is a gifted journalist, this book at times seems discontiuous and incoherent. It is more a collection of magazine articles than a unified thesis. Nevertheless it is an important statement about the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

The Atomic Bazaar provides a great overview of the current state of nuclear proliferation. The book has two primary strengths: (1) It's short- 179 pages, so a busy professional can read it on the subway or in a day, (2) and Langewiesche personally gathered most of the facts for his book by walking the streets and talking with principal players -- as opposed to collecting them in a library.
The book is weak on nuclear design, what it would take to assemble a nuclear weapon, but correctly focuses on the longest pole in the tent, the necessary fissile materiel: Plutonium or U235. From there the author methodically looks at the most likely avenues a terrorist or rogue state could obtain the materiel.
It is written for the generalist, the terms and the science never get too deep, and the author moves quickly. You'll learn the real deal behind A.Q. Khan and how his "house arrest" is really somewhat of a sham to appease Pakistan's ally, the U.S.
Particularly interesting reading is how the U.S. government's efforts to assist Central Asian countries improve their border security are largely ineffectual.
Not a "tour de force," but the book is current, never bogs down, and should be of interest to anyone concerned with the issue of nuclear proliferation.