Great idea and great book
Reviewed by
an Amazon user,
December 14, 2006
This was one of the best textbooks I have read in college. It covers most of the major wars post world war 2 and gives the history leading up to them. You can see a clear dichotomy where the major power in the world leading up to the conflict causes the conflict through foolish colonization policies. Mostly British for the first half and then the United States. It is a good summary overall and is a must have for any student in International Relations or military history. It is a well written and quick read. 5 stars.
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Fascinating and Insightful
Reviewed by
an Amazon user,
March 2, 2006
"Why Nations Go to War" is a very fascinating book to read as it provides some unique perspectives on the reasons that the author views as the cause of nations to go into conflict. The author uses a clear and simple style of writing that make it easy to read and understand his arguments, propositions and conclusions, even if one does not agree with them.
Basically, Stoessinger argues that the national leaders play the decisive role in bringing nations into conflict. It is the characteristics and ego of the leader that, at the critical moment, makes the difference between nations crossing the Rubicon and ultimately committing to go to war. Other factors such as territorial disputes, economic considerations or clash of religions or civilisations may be contributory but not the main cause for nations to go to war. The author supports his views with some well presented, insightful and compelling case studies.
Stoessinger critically examines the characters, personalities and egos of some of the modern leaders that took their nations to war and shows how poor judgements and wrong perceptions led to disasters and untold suffering for their countries.
This is a well researched book that emphasises the importance of moral courage on the part of leaders to prevent war and not allow their fragile egos to cause unnecessary suffering to other human beings. Although this is easier said than done, this message from the author is compelling.
I recommend the book to anyone with an interest in history, international relations and war.
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Very interesting perspective
Reviewed by
an Amazon user,
October 9, 2005
I was originally required to read this book for a class, but found it interesting anyway :).
In any case, I have always been interested in history, and almost majored in it in college, and so found this book particularly interesting. His concept is so simple, and yet so often overlooked. As I understand it, his basic point is that people often think of wars as being caused by factors such as religious differences, economics, etc. Stoessinger argues that these types of factors are necessary but not sufficient. You also need additional factors, particularly misperceptions.
I think that he makes a pretty decent case for this, his examples are appropriately chosen, and he makes some very interesting observations. I think many of his ideas have very great explaining power and should be a consideration in any discussion of war.
Definitly a recommended read, particularly if you're interested in history or political science.
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A Product of a Non-Existent Discipline
Reviewed by
an Amazon user,
September 12, 2005
The title of a book is a promise to the reader, in this case to answer the question. Stoessinger makes little effort to make good on his promise.
When we ask "why" we are asking a question of causation, not a question of what proximate events surrounded and immediately preceeded another event. Nor are we asking for speculative assertions about the centrality of the psychological culture of a country which are easily disproven by any broader knowledge of human behavior and history.
For example, Stroessinger is "convinced that Hitler's charismatic grip on Germany can best be explained by the authoritarian structure of the family." How then do we explain the numerous similar charismatic grips held by leaders in other countries, with different family structures, throughout history? For example, Stalin, Mao, Peron, Napoleon, numerous rulers in Africa and elsewhere in the third world?
When we ask a question of causation we are not looking for answers that simply push the question back a level, or back in time, and leave it to languish there. When we ask a general question of causation such as "why nations go to war" we are seeking general answers, answers that reveal regularities and provide insight into why they exist.
So an examination of the proximate details, yet again, of WWI or WWII or any other specific war is not germain to the question at hand. To pretend to answer by describing some detail or asserting some psychological state is to beg the question...why then did that detail or psychological state exist?
Stroessinger seeks to emphasize the role of the individual leader and find the ""moment of truth" when leaders crossed the threshold into war." Unfortunately this is a very poorly concieved approach. First, because nations are not buttons to be pushed that respond automatically. Bush could decide tomorrow to attack Britain, but I doubt that anyone would respond. The people of the country have to also largely be willing to go to war with whatever country is in question.
The second problem is that he appears to be ignorant of the psychology of commitment, that one small decision can commit us psychologically to many more larger ones in the same direction. This is how corruption and corporate scandal often develops as well. People dont start out corrupt, they start out willing to look the other way and not say anything. People also dont start out willing to go massacre a whole enemy town, there is a process. That process has it's own momentum that pushes it along, each step making the next more likely, so the critical issue is when the process starts and how, not some randomly judged "threshold."
International Relations is terminally conflicted. On the one hand they seek regularities of human behavior, and on the other hand they seek to ignore the fact that all the people involved are humans, that there is just one species involved here.
Somehow they have convinced themselves of the obviously false proposition that explaining universal paterns by asserting that it is the "state system" which makes the paterns happen means that they can avoid being "deterministic." They seem to feel that explaining universal regularities of human behavior by noting that humans share a lot of genes in common with each other would be "deterministic." They also want to examine a behavior patern at the state level but ignore all the piles of evidence that the same behavior patern occurs at the band and tribal levels as well. As if ignorance will allow insight.
When it comes to the issues that Stroessinger promises in his title to address he is in fact hilariously ignorant. In the few paragraphs he devotes to the asserted topic of his book, why humans go to war, he makes a complete fool of himself. He has been so dismissive of human nature, the effects of evolution on making humans behavioraly predisposed for war, that he is
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On the 9th Edition.
Reviewed by
an Amazon user,
May 3, 2005
I read the 9th edition of WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR in a college interdisciplinary class about the Problem of War & Peace. The book is divided into ten different sections and covers what it lumps together as 9 major wars (the author considers several small wars as coninuations of other wars): WWI, WWII, The Korean War, The Vietnam War, the Bosnian War, the wars between India & Pakistan, the wars between Israel and Arab countries, Saddam Hussein's wars against Iran & Kuwait, the War in Afghanistan & the American-Iraqi War. The last section of the book provides the authors thesis to the question the title of the book raises, why do nations go to war?
I didn't agree with everything that the author wrote. Also, though the book is heavily researched, there are some errors (for instance, recently released documents have proven that the Chinese were working together with the Soviets during the Korean War and weren't just planning on, but were intending for the U.S. to invade North Korea--it was essential to their military strategy). Despite these disagreements and flaws, I found the book fascinating. It provides a fairly thorough backdrop for most of the conflicts it talks about and though the author's assessments of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are questionable, it still provides for a thought-provoking read.
Stoessinger's general thesis to the question of "why do nations go to war?" is that nations don't actually go to war, but the leaders of those nations do. He seems to contend that it isn't the people of the countries who are necessarily at fault and instead, the people in charge are the ones who should be held most responsible. Though there is some truth to this assertion, blaming any single person for a war is a bit absurd. The American Wild West no longer exists. Nations go to war--not people. Stoessinger seems to believe that except in extreme cases (WW II, Bosnian War) war is unnecessary. I tend to accept a more Hobbesian view of human nature and believe that despite the best human efforts, in the fallen world in which we live, war is inevitable. However, though I disagree, I really enjoyed reading the book and found the epilogue especially moving. Recommened for anyone who has an interest in world affairs and history.
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