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Extreme Insider's view of peace process
“The author has been very involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process through the administration of various US presidents. He is able to tell a fairly non-partisan tale of the good and the bad of presidents from Nixon to Bush Jr. This detailed personal knowledge of the peace process players is also the book's downfall. There is too much information about the people, personal relationships and negotiating conditions. At times it drifts in to minutia of the author's experience that would be more appropriate in a personal memoir than in the general history it purports to be.”
An amazon user wrote this on 2009-11-06. -
0 of 3 members found this review helpful.
Missing points
“There several missing points in this book, which, nevertheless, is very interesting and professional.
An amazon user wrote this on 2009-09-14.
Starting in 1948 from very first day of recreation of the State of Israel on the part of Israel territory, Arab countries waged several wars to eliminate Israel from her historic land. Israel won all wars and now Arab countries propose a peace agreement with Israel under conditions, which they intended to dictate. However, only Israel, who won all the wars and defeated Arab countries, has legal rights to formulate and dictate peace agreement terms and conditions, which, in general, shell include the following provisions:
1. Palestinian Muslims must compensate Jews for damages caused by Jews massacres (actually, it was Holocaust) conducted in Palestine in 1920s-1930s under British administration supervision, for providing Hitler with idea of Final Solution and for taking active part in implementing the idea in Europe.
2. Arab countries must compensate Israel for damages inflicted on Israel during wars launched by Arab countries.
3. Arab countries must compensate several million Jews expelled from Arab countries between 1948 and 1953, where they lived for centuries, for violation of international law and stilling Jewish properties.
4. Arab countries must recognize "Article 24 of the 1964 PLO charter addressed to UN, which stipulates: Palestinian Muslims do not claim Judea and Samaria (West Bank) and Gaza their territories", which gives Israel full legal rights to remove Muslims from occupied Israel land of Palestine.
5. Arab countries must comply with Geneva Convention, which recognizes Israel rights on Gaza, Judea and Samaria, historic Jewish land liberated by Israel in 1967 war from Jordan and Egypt occupation.
6. Arab countries must recognize Jerusalem as historic Israel capital.
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2 of 2 members found this review helpful.
Forthright
“I feel that this title is quite appropriate for this work. I found Aaron Miller's book to be a forthright and honest attempt at a historical analysis. What I found so refreshing though was the author's level of honesty. It is hard enough to find books that attempt a balanced view of these issues without adding to it the fact that the writer was very much an active participant in the very history they are attempting to analyze. I felt as if there were no attempt to whitewash or to put a better face on his or the US's role in this history, and so that makes this a very important book. While I may not always agree with his analysis, this disagreement is due to my interpreting the facts differently rather than over how the author has laid out the facts.
An amazon user wrote this on 2009-07-01.
The book has a colloquial and anecdotal style that I normally cannot stand, but I think Miller did an excellent job mixing the anecdotal with the scholarly. I didn't find that the style detracted from the substance at all which is the usual problem I have with such works. Instead the style gives the reader a greater feel for how diplomacy works. The interviews and anecdotes bring US diplomacy down from the ethereal plains back down to the human level. Readers get the opportunity to see just how difficult these negotiations really are. It isn't this abstract chess board were large pieces are moved, but rather it is on the personal level where participants thrash out differences face to face. One gets to see just how much personalities play in diplomacy, and we get to see that this diplomacy is the work of hundreds of people and it evolves over time. Today's failure may be the ground work for tomorrow's breakthrough.
I really liked his look into the role of pro-Israel lobbying groups in the US. I think his analysis is very important. These lobbyists are neither all-powerful hands guiding US policy but neither are they completely benign. They are nothing nefarious though. These groups are doing nothing but using the US system to advocate for their policies. This is perfectly legal, and it is essentially the American way of doing politics. My only problem is that I feel these groups have a certain negative impact on US policy in that they have the affect of making the Israeli perspective the default position of US governments. This does affect our balance, and our ability to be honest arbiters in this conflict. This doesn't mean that the US policy can't be affective or that it is forever tilted to the Israelis, but it does mean that more often than not the US is looking at any problems that arise from the Israeli viewpoint rather than from a balanced perspective. The author explains this very well, and also shows how this tilt towards Israel can have benefits as well.
My one fundamental disagreement with this author's analysis is on the Camp David summit under Clinton. The author asserts that the US's unpreparedness was not a critical error that ensured the failure of these negotiations. The author explains that there were still huge gaps between the two sides along with big problems with trust between the sides and constituencies in Israel and the Arab world. While all of this is true, and the possibility of getting substantive agreements from both sides was remote, the fact that the US was unprepared and scrambling during these talks ensured that the two sides would fail to bridge the gap. The US gave too much deference to Israeli political constraints and this sullied the US negotiators from the outset. The US team should have come into these talks armed with a working paper that would have had both sides screaming and threatening to walk out, but instead they allowed the Israelis to have a hand in the drafting of the US starting position. In the end these talks were probably doomed to failure before they ever began, but the US team ensured that failure by not being prepared. Both the Israelis and Palestinians needed a tough and robust arbiter at Camp David to push, cajole and extort the two sides into bridging gaps instead they were largely lead by unfolding events.
All in all this is a great book that will inform all readers. The author takes a very balanced approach that offers readers a valuable perspective. I highly recommend this work.
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1 of 1 members found this review helpful.
Couldn't put it down (even though it was an audio book)
“Fascinating no holds review of U.S. Middle East policy - willing to take on cherished myths on either side. So interesting that it kept me away from daily NPR news.”
An amazon user wrote this on 2009-06-27. -
0 of 3 members found this review helpful.
The over-promised book
“I was seeking understanding of the MidEast, This book doesn't provide that. It starts in the middle of a long history of conflict, and ends at essentially the same point, providing a bit of anecdotal information along the way. It won't help anyone trying to learn about the middle east; and it seems to me that it would be of no value to anyone who already understands the area.”
An amazon user wrote this on 2009-04-03.
